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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a historical analysis of the evolution of
strategic planning in the United States during the years 1919-
1941. It examines the interwar genesis of U.S. strategic
culture, and focuses on three aspects: structure, process, and
products. Army, Navy, and joint planning agencies, as well as
their interrelationships, are analyzed. Within the military,
the planning process was limited throughout the interwar years
by a lack of national policy guidance. Moreover, the joint
planning process was hindered by a lack of executive authority
and inattention to the production and incorporation of
strategic intelligence information. The products of interwar
planning efforts were increasingly sophisticated strategic
plans and, more importantly, a corps of strategists who were
subsequently ablc to craft the winning strategy for World Wa.
II. The study concludes that despite its ad hoc origins, the
American planning structure produced successful strategic
thinkers and concepts, and the interwar years provided the
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The 1898 marked a watershed in U.S. history. The country
emerged from the Spanish-American War as a power to be
reckoned with; possessing energy and vast power but lacking
the foreign policy machinery to realize its national interest.
Each ensuing war pushed the nation further along a new and
undesired direction towards world leadership. After World War
I, the U.S. sought to renounce its responsibility as the pre-
eminent power by lapsing into an almost petulant isolationism
and anti-militarism; as if war could be avoided simply by
means of diplomacy without regard to military power.
The Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, left the pride
of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet lying in the muck on the
bottom of Pearl Harbor. The war which for so long the United
States sought to avoid had come at last. Four and one-half
years later it concluded and the U.S. emerged as the world
leader par excellence and the sole possessor of the dernier
cri in weaponry--the atomic bomb. But was this successful
outcome the result of thorough planning or merely good
fortune? Did we enter the war with a viable strategic plan?
If so, how was it arrived at? More importantly for our
purposes, what was the nature of the U.S. strategic planning
process during the preceding interwar years? How does an era
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which some would consider ancient history relate to the
present? What follows is an explanation of the ad hoc
admi4istrative history the U.S. strategic planning process as
it evolved in the twilight years between this century's two
world wars and especially its search for a strategic
coherence.
This study's hypothesis is that the interwar years
provided the genesis of strategic planning as we know it today
and that this influence is generally unrecognized today.
Furthermore, a historical examination of the strategic
planning process during those years can provide usefual insight
into the following questions:
" Is coordinated strategy planning a desireable goal? Why?
" Is the accuracy of strategic plans more important, or less
important, than the process?
" What are the primary products, explicit or implicit, of
the strategic planning process?
" What are essential elements which must be included in the
process in order for it to be effective?
The interwar years are of interest to strategic planners
for a number of reasons. First of all, the period from 1918-
1941 marks a transitional era which followed World War I; the
first major mobilization of the U.S. population for war.
Additionally, it precedes World War II. A conflict which
completed the transformation of the U.S. national security
structure that was begun as a result of the Spanish American
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War and was furthered by World War I. During this time, the
nation struggled to resolve two opposing exigencies:
traditional isolationism cum pacifism fueled by revulsion to
the European political machinations which led to the war as
well as the horrific casualties which ensued; and the military
imperatives, driven by the nature of modern warfare, which
promised to exact extreme penalties from those nations caught
unprepared. It was a question of finding the balance between
the nation's proclivity toward a militia-based military that
was fundamentally dependent upon mobilization on the one hand
and reliance upon a professional standing military on the
other.
Second, the interwar years were a period of political
fermentation. The map of Europe was once again redrawn, at the
behest of the victors of World War I, to emasculate the
offending losers. New countries were created. Nascent powers,
such as Japan, waxed while others waned. An optimistic
political experiment called the League of Nations was
conceived, accepted by the world, and subsequently spurned by
its motherl id. Rabid nationalism in the form of communism,
fascism, and Nazism were spawned in the husks of countries
bled dry by World War I and the Great Depression. For
strategic planners, this meant that the nature and direction
of the threat were not always clear and the problems of long-
term strategic planning were subsequently compounded.
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Third, the interwar years were a period of rapid
technological change. In particular, the military was
grappling with the implications of new and rapidly evolving
weapons such as the airplane, the submarine, and the tank.
Accompanying and advocating these new weapons were heretical
young officers such as Billy Mitchell, B.H. Liddell Hart,
Heinz Guderian, and M.N. Tukhachevsky. These upstarts
challenged established military doctrine and fueled the
controversy over the future structure of the military; thus,
further complicating the planner's calculus.
Fourth, a nation horrified by the excesses of the war in
Europe and the "evils" of modern weapons embraced the
burgeoning pacifist movement. Spurred by Wilsonian idealism,
professions of peaceful intent and arms limitations were
signed on an unprecedented scale. Battleships, the strategic
weapons of the day, melted under the pens of signatories of
the Washington Treaty in 1922. At Locarno, Italy in 1925, the
primary belligerents of World War I met to renounce aggression
as an instrument of policy. Voices of concern were drowned in
the rising "peace tide".
Finally, the nation struggled with the problem of defining
an integrated combined defense organization in an era of
economic and political (i.e. as regards attitudes toward the
military) austerity. The booming promise of the twenties soon
gave way to the broken dreams of the thirties. A nation
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struggling wearily in the throes of the Great Depression could
barely provide for the basic needs of her people--let alone
pay for military expenditures. Competition for the shrinking
defense dollar did little to promote the interservice
cooperation required for coherent coordinated strategic
planning.
Clearly, there are a number of parallels with today.
First, we are presently in the midst of a transitional stage
in the evolution of our national security structure. The
recent, apparent crumbling of "cold war" paradigms has
prompted a reexamination of the defensive needs and strategic
assumptions of our national security structure. While the
Soviet Union remains our primary nuclear threat, the events
of the past year have reduced the Warsaw Pact to an empty
shell. Meanwhile, third world countries are increasingly
gaining access to sophisticated weapons such as ballistic
missiles and nuclear technology--without acquiring
commensurate restraints to their use.
Second, the political landscape of the world is evolving
from a traditional east-west bipolarity into multipolarity.
The incredible changes occurring within the Soviet Union, the
emancipation of Eastern Europe, the growth of the European
Economic Community, and the resurgence of Japan as an economic
juggernaut all signal the need to reassess our strategy.
5
Third, advances in computing, directed energy weapons, the
Strategic Defense Initiative, stealth technology, and
proliferation of nuclear weapons are all examples of the
unparalleled 'echnological changes occurring today. Many of
today's weapons have never been used in combat. Much like the
tank, the submarine, and the airplane of yesterday; the
effects of modern weapons have yet to be fully integrated into
the strategic calculus.
Fourth, arms control once again occupies center stage as
the United States and Soviet Union play out their strategic
duet. For the first time ever, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty has eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and its
successors hold the promise of vastly reduced strategic
nuclear arsenals. As a result, the ultimate structure of our
nuclear deterrent force is the subject of much debate--and few
answers are forthcoming.
Finally, the United States is once again entering an era
of economic austerity for the armed forces as the nation
struggles to balance the costs of modern weaponry with the
very real social welfare needs of her populace. It is
increasingly difficult to justify the current U.S. force
structure or the acquisition of new weapons when our foremost
enemy has apparently renounced his "evil ways". Truly, it is
commonly perceived that when "peace is breaking out" around
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the world, military expenditures can be trimmed to support
social expenditures. This, in turn, has a tendency to increase
the competition or infighting amongst the services to retain
their share of the shrinking defense budget or salvage their
favored weapons program. Decisions made in this environment
often have more to do with political e:pediencies than an
overarching strategic framework.
This investigation will proceed by examining three facets
of strategic planning during the interwar years: structure,
process, and product. It will begin by looking at the
evolution of the interwar strategic planning structure. What
was its history i.e., how did the historical national security
roles of each service impact the structure? What changes were
brought about as a result of World War I? What were the
principal strategic planning organizations? How did they
relate to each other? What was the involvement of other, non-
military government agencies? Was there any joint planning
organization?
Next, It will look at how strategic planning between the
wars in terms of process. What was the context (e.g.
organizational culture, personnel) in which planning took
place? What were the sources of planning guidance? How were
the plans conceived, drafted, validated, and approved? How did
planners accommodate change? Were war games and exercises
employed?
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The following chapter discusses the products, explicit and
implicit, of the interwar strategic planning process. To what
extent did the planning reflect U.S. foreign policy, national
interests, and political morality? Was the planning coherent
and realistic? How accurate were the plans? How did the plans
evolve over time? Were there any missing elements?
Finally, it will conclude with some observations about
Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. It will attempt to draw
lessons regarding joint strategic planning as a process. In
addition, it will identify structural pitfalls as well as
strengths which hold promise for today's strategic planning
efforts.
The concept of "jointness" is much in vogue among today's
political and military leaders. While the idea of interservice
coordination and cooperation may not be new, the strength of
the current emphasis is. In part, this emphasis on joint
planning, command, and operations is a reaction to the
perceived inadequacies in the execution of military operations
in the early 1980s (e.g.in Iran, Grenada, and Lebanon). As the
services seemed unwilling or incapable of reform, Congress
addressed the issue by passing the Goldwater-Nichols Defensed
Reorganization Act of 1986 in an attempt to foster more
coordination and cooperation amongst the services. The U.S.
has been grappling with the problem of constructing a coherent
national security policy planning structure for over 90 years
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now. For the strategist, perh, ps this examination of the joint
planning process during the interwar years will provide some
clues to the way ahead.
II. STRUCTURE
In order to understand the development of strategic
planning within the defense establishment of the United States
one must look at the genesis of the organizations which were
responsible for this process. While the interwar years (i.e.
1918-1940) comprise the period of most significant change,
many important lessons may otherwise be observed in the two
decades before the First World War.
This chapter will be concerned with the structure of the
defense planning establishment. Tihat were the component
organizations? What were their duties, responsibilities, and
modes of interaction? What was the involvement of the other
government agencies (e.g. State Department)? How successful
were the planning efforts of the War and Navy Departments in
developing joint strategic plans?
A. NAVY DEPARTMENT PLANNING AGENCIES
1. The General Board of the Navy
The General Board of the Navy was established by the
Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, with General Order No.
544 on March 13, 1900. Its raison d'etre was to act as the
Secretary's principal advisor regarding naval policy matters-
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-including planning for war.1 To this end it directed the
efforts of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval War
College as they related to the development of war plans. This
ensured close cooperation between the three agencies during
the planning process. One observer in 1913 went so far as to
advocate that since "The Naval War College and the Office of
Naval Intelligence are so closely related to the duties of the
General Board that the three organizations should be housed
under one roof... '2 Once the war plans were finalized by the
General Board, they were forwarded to the Secretary of the
Navy for approval.
As a consultative body, and even though it possessed
neither executive or administrative authority, the General
Board served as the Navy's de facto general staff.3 Indeed,
its impetus can be traced back to Secretary Long's reasoning
for establishing its immediate predecessor--the Naval War
Board of 1898. "The Secretary lacking professional experience,
1A.F. Carter, CDR, USN, "The Functions of the Office of
Naval Operations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 46, no.
2 (February 1920): 169.
2W.S. Crosley, CDR, USN, "The Naval War College, the
General Staff, and the Office of Naval Intelligence," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 39, no. 3 (September 1913): 969.
3Jarvis Butler, "The General Board of the Navy," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 56, no. 8 (August 1930): 703.
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and the Navy being without a General Staff, it was necessary
that he should have the assistance of such a board."
4
Originally, the General Board's members consisted of:
The Admiral of the Navy, the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, the Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal
assistant, the president of the Naval War College and his
principal assistant, and three other officers as appointed by
the Secretary.5 When Congress revamped the Navy Department in
1915, the Office of Naval Operations was created and
subsequently replaced the Bureau of Navigation as the
"operational" representative on the board. With addition of
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the composition of the
General board ultimately stabilized at four ex officio
members: the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, the Director of Naval Intelligence , and the
President of the Naval War College. In addition, the Secretary
of the Navy selected other officers to serve on the board as
required.6  Figure II-1 summarizes the General Board
composition from 1900-1941.
4 John D. Long, quoted in Alfred T. Mahan, "The Work of
the Naval War Board of 1898," Letters and Papers of Alfred
Thayer Mahan, vol. 3, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D.
Maguire (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 628.
Emphasis added by Mahan.
5Richard Wainwright, RADM, USN, "The General Board," U.S.
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Figure II-1. General Board Composition 1900-1941.
Asterisks (*) denote members deleted in 1901.
The General Board was created to provide the Secretary
of the Navy with coordinated and coherent advice regarding the
perspective of the professional navy. Since its members were
highly respected and experienced naval officers, its
recommendations were well supported by the Navy in general and
carried great weight with the Secretary of the Navy. As Jarvis
Butler described it, "The General Board is the balance wheel
and coordinating body which advises the Secretary of the Navy
in maintaining a sound and progressive program for the





2. War Plans Division
The naval appropriation act of 1915 provided a
statutory basis for the Office of Naval Operations as
ostensibly the first among equals in the Navy Department's
fragmented "bureau" system of m a' --.At 8 Its head, the Chief
of Naval Operations, was °-tfl ' $ tasked, under the
Secretary of the Navy's direction, aith the operations of the
fleet as well as with the prepara' "a and readiness of plans
for its use in war.9 As a result, tne War Plans Division of
the Office of Naval Operations assumed the responsibility for
drafting plans for mobilization and war from the General
Board.
Even so, the General Board's role in war planning was
not entirely discarded. Naval Regulations suntequently
directed that "The General Board shall be furnished, for
8The "bureau" system consisted of a number of all but
independent fiefdoms ruled by various captains and admirals
in the position of bureau chiefs. There was some amount of
cooperation amongst the various bureaus. However, it was
essentially management by committee with the Secretary of the
Navy as the referee. This arrangement suited peacetime
administration of the navy as well as "pork-barrel" politics,
but was ill-suited to the exigencies of wartime operations.
With the creation of the office of Naval Operations in 1915,
the beginnings of a more responsive and responsible
operational management was established--although remnants of
the bureau system remain part of the U.S. Navy today. See
Elting E. Morison, LCDR, USNR, "Naval Administration in the
United States," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 72, no. 10
(October 1946): 1303-1313.
9E.W. Eberle, ADM, USN, The Office of Naval Oper ions."
U.S. Naval Institute ProceedinQs 53, no. 11 (November 1927):
1153.
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information, with the approved war plans, including
cooperation with the Army and employment of the elements of
naval defense."'10 In other words, despite its truncated duties,
the General Board remained an important consultative input to
the Secretary of the Navy during the war planning process.
The head of the War Plans Division was the Director of
Plans, a rear admiral.11 Under the Director of Plans, War Plans
Division was charged not ,)nly with the developme-it of war
plans but also their maintenance in a current status as
conditions changed. Once approved by the Secretary of the
Navy, war plans were intended to serve as a guide to
coordinate the efforts of the Navy Department (including its
bureaus and offices) in the justification, preparation, and
upkeep of naval forces.
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3. Office of Naval Intelligence
The Office of Naval Cntelligence was created iD 1882
and subsequently subordinated to the Office of Nava!
Operations in 1915.13 Under the direction of the Chief of Naval




13U.S. National Archives, Federal Records of World War
II: Military Agencies, vol. 2 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1951), 577.
15
for the Navy Department, as well as publishing and
disseminating it throughout the Navy and to cognizant
government agencies.14 From its inception, it was deeply
involved in war planning. As such, it represented the Navy's
.first step in the direction of organized planning for
war. 
15
Prior to the war with Spain, both the Office of Naval
Intelligence and the Naval War College presented strategic
studies to an intradepartmental defense planning board. Under
the direction of the President, Office of Naval Intelligence
went on to draw up plan!. for the war with Spain which were
subsequently approved by this board.16 Subsequent events
outpaced the scope of these efforts. When the Naval War Board
of 1898 was created, the Office of Naval Intelligence's
efforts fell under its sway and under its direction provided
intelligence support for its short-fused planning efforts.
After the war, the General Board succeeded the Naval War Board
as the source of planning guidance. Intimate coordination
prevailed between these two agencies until 1915; when the
Office of Naval Operations gained permanent authority over the





Emerging from World War I, the Office of Naval
Intelligence found itself caught in a perplexing dilemma: How
to resolve the conflicting demands of its traditional role of
providing strategic and technical data for war planners, and
also provide security for the U.S. and its navy against
internal and external threats--often by covert means. The
wartime expansion of this security function created a
stubborn, persistent and headstrong clandestine operations
bureaucracy which successive Directors of Naval Intelligence
found themselves unable to eliminate altogether. This in turn,
sapped vital organizational capital from the support of the
primary function of providing strategic intelligence.17
4. Naval War College
The Naval War College was established in 1884 under
the direction of president Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. Its
mission was succinctly outlined by Admiral Luce as,
"instruction in the art of war."'18 Like the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the Naval War College also played a role in
strategic planning from its earliest days. Prior to the
establishment of the General Board, "U.S. naval war planning
'
7Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's
Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945, (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1983), 7-8.
",W.V. Pratt, ADM, USN, "The Naval War College," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 53, no. 9 (September 1927): 937-
938.
17
was confined to ad hoc work at the Naval War College."'19
Indeed, when the conflict with Spain ruptured in 1898, "the
only plan for the war which the administration had was one
worked out at this [Naval] War College in the summer of 1895,
and as it was the only one, at all carefully digested, it was
perforce the one which both the army and navy followed.",
20
Like the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Naval War
College efforts in strategic planning fell under the direction
of the General Board. Plans were periodically assigned to the
War College for study and criticism. This practice grew during
the early years of the school when the faculty was not fully
occupied during the winter and summer sessions. 2 This
convention continued, to a lesser extent, when the War College
came under the Office of Naval Operations.
22
As the Naval War College matured and the college
developed into a full-time academic institution, work on the
development of strategic plans was shifted to the newly formed
War Plans Division in the Office of Naval Operations. Instead,
the Naval War College devoted more effort to the development
'
9Michael Vlahos, "The Naval War College and the Origins
of War Planning Against Japan," Naval War ColleQe Review 33,
no.4 (July-August 1980): 10.
20William L. Rodgers, CAPT, USN, "The Relations of the
War College to the Navy Department," U.S. Naval Institute




of war gaming; not only as an instructional tool, but also as
a means of examining the Navy's strategic plans. In Michael
Vlahos's analysis, "The [Naval War College] games not only
encouraged an evolution in war plans during the interwar
period, they came to drive the development of the 1930s
version of a U.S. maritime strategy."'23
Figure 11-2 illustrates the relationships between the
Navy's strategic planning agencies. For simplicity, the
organizational level equivalents to the Chief of Naval
Operations have not been shown.
Havy Planning Structure
01Cr7 ] eneral
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Figure 11-2.
23Michael Vlahos, "War Gaming, An Enforcer of Strategic
Realism: 1919-1942," Naval War College Review 39, no. 2
(March-April 1986): 7.
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B. WAR DEPARTMENT PLANNING AGENCIES
1. War Plans Division
The War Plans Division was constituted as the fifth
division of the War Department General Staff in 1921. It owed
its genesis to the recommendations of Generals Pershing and
Harbord as incorporated in the National Defense Act of 1920.
This act laid out the primary makeup of the War Department
until the onset of World War II. 24 The General Staff divisions
consisted of: Personnel (G-l), Military Intelligence (G-2),
Operations and Training (G-3), Supply (G-4), and War Plans
Division (WPD). All of the General Staff division heads held
the title of Assistant Chief of Staff and were brigadier
generals (with the exception of Military Intelligence
Division).25 In Army ReQulations, War Plans Division was
"charged in general with those duties of the War Department
General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the
use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately
24Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations
Division, The United States Army in World War II, The War
Department, vol. 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1951), 19.
25Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and
Preparations, The United States Army in World War II, The War
Department, vol. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1950), 70.
20
or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national
defense. ,,26
Ostensibly, War Plans Division was coequal with the
other four General Staff divisions. Yet implicit in the nature
of its duties was its position as the Chief of Staff's
principal advisor and catalyst for strategic planning between
the wars--as well as being earmarked to provide the core of
his General Headquarters in the field at the outbreak of war.
27
The failing of this General Headquarters concept was that it
assumed a major effort in a single theater or front.28 In
addition, successive Chiefs of Staff customarily referred many
general as well as complex problems to the division for study-
-often in the area of national policy and foreign relations.
29
War Plans Division was unique in that it was the sole
staff agency which represented the Army in extradepartmental
(i.e. joint) strategic planning. In this respect, War Plans
Division's responsibilities as the designated planning agency
were much broader than the other divisions of the General
Staff. It was concerned mainly with the broad strategic scope
26Cline, 29.
27Watson, 74.
21yaurice Matlofi, "The American Approach to War, 1919-
1945," The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard,




of developing war plans while the other General Staff
divisions were used to f11 in the requisite detail.31
War Plans Divis. -n was seen as the cornerstone of
General Staff strategic planning. It orchestrated the efforts
of all the general Staff divisions in regard to their impact
on war planning. Yet, because it was a co-equal, not a
superior, of the other divisions, any disputes over the




The Military Intelligence Division dated, in various
forms, as a headquarters unit back to 1885.33 Like War Plans
Division, its drities were similarly broad in scope as it was
tasked in general with the collection, evaluation, and
dissemination of information regarding potential enemies or
areas of military operations. Despite Military Intelligence
Division's analysis function, War Plans Division normally
exerted its prerogative for turning raw intelligence data
31Dana G. Mead, "United States Strategic Planning, 1920-
1941: The Color Plans to the Victory Program," (Ph.D. diss.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), 25.
32Cline, 36-38.
33David Kahn, "The United States Views Germany and Japan
in 1941," Knowing One's Enemies: Intellicfence Assessment
Before the Two World Wars, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston: Allen
& Unwin, 1979), 487.
22
gathered by G-2 into finished propositions for incorporation
into strategic plans.
34
Military Intelligence Division's various staff duties
included the supervision of military attaches and missions
abroad, liaison with foreign attaches and missions in the
U.S., counterintelligence, map making, photographic
intelligence collection and interpretation, operating the
translating sorvice for the War Department, coordination of
j' int intelligence collection activities, and the supervision
of War Department propaganda and psychological warfare
activities35. Military Intelligence Division's most important
sources of information were diplomatic reports, information
from friendly nations, military attaches, signal intelligence,
open press, and private citizens. Notice that covert sources
were not included on the list. Covert sources (i.e. spies)
were not employed by the U.S. as the interwar political
culture obviated that option.36
3. Army War College
The Army War College was founded in 1903 through the
efforts of War Department Secretary Elihu Root. Modeled on the





an adjunct to the General Staff and a pre-eminent facility to
offer postgraduate education to supplement the lesser army
schools. He charged it with providing instruction in he called
the "science of war." In other words, the study of the
complexities of national defense, of military science, and of
responsible command. From its inception, the Army War College
acted as a strategic planning adjunct of the General staff.37
From 1903 to 1917, the college functioned essentially
and fairly successfully as a strategic planning agency for the
General Staff. As an educational institution, it was less
successful and unable to move beyond being a school of
advanced tactics. In either case, its efforts were not
adequate to the realities of the U.S. entry into World War
1.38
After a short hiatus during World War I, the Army War
College re-established itself with a more distinct separation
from the General Staff, although it fell short of being
divorced entirely from the war planning process. Instead, it
concentrated its efforts on becoming the paramount
professional military institution that was originally
envisioned by Secretary Root.39 There remained, however, a
37Harry P. Ball, "A History of the U.S. Army War College:




persistent dichotomy regarding the War College's role in two
areas: First, whether the focus of instruction should be on
the broad scope of national defense or on the narrower problem
of military science i.e. on strategy or operations. Second,
how much involvement there should be with the General Staff-
-especially with the War Plans Division.
In the joint arena, the Army War College established
firm ties with its naval sibling in order to facilitate the
study of joint operations and planning--including joint war
games as well as faculty and student exchanges.40 Figure 11-3
shows the Army war planning organization during the interwar
years.
40Henry G. Gole, "War Planning at the Army War College in
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C. JOINT PLANNING AGENCIES
1. Joint Army and Navy Board
The Joint Army and Navy Board, or as it was more
commonly known--the Joint Board, was established in July 1903(
by the Secretaries of War and the Navy. Its purpose was to
make recommendations to the secretaries regarding matters -of
mutual interest and cooperation between the two services such
as war planning, training, and national security measures.
The Joint Board's original membership consisted of four Army
and four Navy officers selected personally by the Secretary.
26
Following World War I however, the membership was reduced to
six, all designated by office: The Chief of Staff, the
Director of Operations Division, the Director of War Plans
Division, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operation, and the Director of the Navy's War Plans
Division.41
In 1939, the Deputy Chief of Staff replaced the
Director of Operations Division and the Joint Board was placed
under the direction of President Roosevelt. Somewhat belatedly
in July 1941, need for air representation was acknowledged
with the inclusion of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air (Army)
and the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to the Joint Board
(Navy). Figure 11-4 provides a summary of changes to the Joint
Board composition prior to World War II. The Joint Board had
a number of subsidiary committees, only two of which will be
discussed: The Joint Planning Committee, created in 1919, and
the Joint Intelligence Committee which first met in December
1941.42
The Joint Board was still in its infancy in the years
following World War I. In fact, it had yet to consider a joint
strategic plan. The aftermath of the Washington Conference
with its changed strategic situation in the Pacific prompted
the Joint Board to task the Joint Planning Committee to begin
41Federal Records, 37.
42Ibid., 37; Cline, 44-45.
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drawing up the first joint Army and Navy war plans in the
early 1920s. These were the "color" plns in which colors
were used to designate various potential enemies. For example,
Orange (Japan) was a principal concern to the Navy because of
its proximity to China and the Philippines as well as the U.S.
Pacific island territories. Whereas the Army was more
concerned with defending the U.S. against an invasion by,
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Operations Operations
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Figure 11-4. Joint Board Composition. Asterisk (*)
denotes replacement for Director of Operations Division
in 1939.
43William R. Braistad, "On the American Red and Red-Orange
Plans, 1919-1939," Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Centurv.
1900-1945: Essays in the Honor of Arthur Marder, ed. Gerald
Jordan (London: Croon Helm, Ltd.), 172.
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Once a plan was agreed upon by the Joint Board, it
was forwarded to the service secretaries for final approval.
The Board was mainly concerned with the co-ordination of
policy and planning. To this end, it met only as required in
order to consider problems of interest. Its purpose was to
advise the service secretaries and, after 1939, the President-
-who held the real decision-making power as well as serve as
the primary vehicle for planning coordination between the
services.
44
a. Joint Planning Committee
The Joint Planning Committee was formed in 1919
with the charter to investigate, study, and report on matters
of interest to the Joint Board. In other words, it was the
working group for the Joint Board and it met much more
frequently than the Joint Board. Its members consisted of
three officers from each service's War Plans Division
including their respective directors.
4 5
The majority of the committee's work consisted of
preparing and briefing committee proposals and strategic plan
drafts to the Joint Board for approval. Once approved, the
matter was "closed" as a subject of current discussion by the
board. Occasionally, the Joint Planning Committee acted as the
44Watson,79; Mead, 37.
4 5Cline,46; Mead, 39-40.
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formal initiating agency for one of the services when it
desired to explore the other service's position on an issue
without bringing it to the attention of the Joint Board
prematurely. Issues which could not be resolved by the
committee were referred to the Joint Board for action.
46
b. Joint Intelligence Committee
The Joint Intelligence Committee was a latecomer
to the interwar strategic planning structure. Subordinate to
the Joint Board, it was created to coordinate the joint
efforts of the Army and Navy intelligence organizations and,
under the impetus of impending war, other non-military
government agencies. Its original membership consisted of the
directors of the services' intelligence agencies, State
Department and Board of Economic Warfare representatives, the
Coordinator of Information (later the Director of Strategic
Services). Unfortunately, it was created much too late to
influence prewar planning as its first session was held on
December 3, 1941. It J.s *Dentioned here primarily to complete
the picture of the in.erwar strategic planning structure on
the eve of World War ii.
47
46Watson,80; Mead, 40.
47FederalRecords, 9; Cline, 45.
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2. Standing Liaison Committee
The Standing Liaison Committee was an
interdepartmental committee created in belated recognition of
the need for coordination between the political and military
components of the government i.e. the State, War, and Navy
Departments. Formed in 1938, its advent was not as late as the
Joint Intelligence Committee's. At the time it was created,
it was the first and only formal mechanism for coordinating
national foreign policy aims between the War, Navy, and State
Departments during the interwar period.
4 8
The Committee consisted of the Chief of Staff, Chief
of Naval Operations, and Under Secretary of State. It was
"...charged with the study of coordination and liaison both
at home and abroad of the three departments concerned, and of
the Foreign Service and two combatant services".4 9 Matters of
national policy involving the three departments were also
topics of committee discussion. Despite its charter, the
committee initially and primarily concerned itself with the
safer arena of political-military relationships in the Western
Hemisphere.
50
48Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military
Consultation in the United States," Political Science




Figure II-5 provides a visual summary of the joint
planning organization as it existed during the interwar years.
Notice that the Standing Liaison Committee and Joint
Intelligence Committee were both late-comers to the process













This chapter discussed the genesis of the strategic
planning structure in the American defense establishment from
1900 to 1941. The emphasis has been on identifying the
32
structure of the primary planning organizations as well as
encapsulating their relationships to each other and to other
government agencies. Figure 11-6 summarizes these
relationships. In the next chapter, the strategic planning
process will be discussed.
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Building upon the preceding description of the U.S.
strategic planning structure, this chapter will concentrate
0upon the planning process during the same period. More
specific questions will address: How was strategic planning
accomplished from beginning to end? Who or what provided the
national security policy guidance used to determine the areas
of strategic concern? Who developed tasking from that
guidance? How were the plans conceived, drafted, validated,
and approved? What roles did each service's planning apparatus
play in comparison with the joint planning structure? Did any
changes occur in tile process over time? Finally, what elements
were missing from the process? In order to give structure to
these complex qaestions, the discussion will be divided in two
parts: The first part will discuss the derivation of national
policy guidance for strategists and the second section will
discuss the strategic plannng process itself.
A. GUIDANCE AND TASKING
Led by President Woodrow Wilson, the United States emerged
from World War I as a world class power. Once his naval
building program of 1916 was complete, the U.S. would possess
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"a navy second to none".51 During the immediate ante bellum
period, as well as the brief U.S. participation in the war,
political-military coordination among the State, War, and Navy
Departments had matured somewhat. The exigencies of active
neutrality and, ultimately, war preparations had forced
consultation between these executive departments to expand
beyond the previous practice. This had consisted of sophomoric
exchanges of circumspect and carefully couched correspondence
amongst the secretaries. This desultory style of communication
had failed utterly as an effective means of policy
coordination with the onset of World War 1.52
In contrast, relations between the members of the early
Wilson administration and the military departments were marked
by studied indifference punctuated by periods of open
hostility to the very idea of political-military coordination
with regard to national security. For example, Wilson's
secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was livid that the
Joint Army and Navy Board had the temerity to propose
adjustments to the fleet's military posture in response to
concerns about tensions with Japan. "He thundered out that
army and navy officers could not be trusted to say what we
should or should not do, till we actually got into war; that
51Robert G. Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1948
(Annapolis: Naval institute Press, 1980), 14.
52May, 163.
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we were discussing not how to wage war, but how not to get
into war.
Bryan experienced a change of heart when war in Europe
found the U.S. unsure as to how to protect her neutrality
rights and a Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board was created
to provide advice. By the time that Robert Lansing took over
as Secretary of State in 1915, correspondence among the
departments had increased three-fold. As war approached,
Lansing met almost daily with General Board and General Staff
members. Despite this new-found spirit of political-military
cooperation at the secretarial/service chief level, Wilson
kept his own counsel; often reaching decisions with little,
if any, input from the departments, including the State
54Department. In regards to strategic planning and national
security policy, since little guidance was forthcoming from
the President or the secretariat, the services were ultimately
left to their own devices.
The post-war environment saw the unraveling of what little
progress had been achieved in coordinating between political
and military policy. As in previous wars, the U.S. was wont
to rush its troops home, demobilize, disarm, and forget that
such a thing as war ever existed. As Urs Schwarz noted, "The
53William Jennings Bryan, quoted in Ernest R. May,
"Political Military Consultation," 166.
54May, 166.
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victory over Germany, that embodiment of militarism--the very
prototype of a country with a standing army, a general staff,
and extensive military establishment--by the American citizen
army, created, as people liked to think, out of nothing,
seemed to confirm the utter superiority -of the American
principle of unpreparedness [italics mine]. ''55 The frenzied
paro,'ysm of isolationism, pacifism, and anti-militarism which
ensued effectively gutted any initiatives aimed at coherent
political-military policy coordination.
Yet the idea of collaboration persisted. Recognizing the
need, the services continued making periodic proposals for the
creation of a joint body for the coordination of national and
military policy. In his 1921 rejection of the latest of a
series of proposals regarding State Department participation
in the Joint Board from acting Navy Secretary Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Hughes wrote, "This appears to me to be in
substance a suggestion that at least provisionally matters of
foreign policy be submitted to the Joint Board. I question the
advisability of this."'56 When pressed further, Hughes conceded
that if the Joint Board were to inform the State Department
of meetings in which the board planned to touch upon foreign
policy, he or a representative might be amenable to attending.
55Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: A New Perspective,
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), 14.
56Charles Evans Hughes, quoted in Ernest R. May, 169.
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Thus, Hughes provided the services with a sop to their
concerns while signaling strong disinterest. His message was
received and the Joint Board elected not to use this approach
to policy coordination for thirteen years.
57
The war had highlighted faults in all three departments
which were subsequently addressed by various reform-minded
legislation. As important as these reforms were to the
maturation of the military command structure, they belied the
idealism driving the real attitude of neglect towards the
military which was about to be made manifest. With the Army
reduced to its prewar state, the Navy became the focus of
attention.
In preparation for the Washington Disarmament conference
of 1921-22, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes was
diligent in soliciting the advice of the General Board. Among
other things, the General Board pressed for a minimum U.S.
fleet equal to the combined British and Japanese fleets. Yet
despite his apparent earnestness, Hughes rejected the General
Board's advice categorically.58 When the conference opened, he
tabled a 5:5:3 ratio of capital ships for the three powers
(i.e. U.S., Great Britain, and Japan, respectively) and




ships. The Navy and its supporters were stunned. In the terms
of one lecturer at the Naval War College decades later:
This was indeed the greatest naval encounter ever on
record. In fifteen minutes Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary
of State, had managed to sink more warships than all the
admirals in the world had sunk in a cycle of centuries.
59
Bad blood over the Washington and subsequent disarmament
conferences continued to stalk political-military relations
for the next two decades.
During the years that followed, the national policy was
a reflection of the popular belief that the U.S. should not
maintain military forces with offensive capability or enter
into alliances. Instead, the country "put its hopes in its
geographic barriers, in international agreements to outlaw war
and limit naval armaments, in diplomatic and economic
sanctions to discourage aggression and in legislation to keep
the United States out of foreign wars."'60 A pacifistic and
economy-minded Congress refused to build even the navy allowed
by treaty. Paradoxically, while the military forces were being
emasculated, our political commitments expanded in relative
terms. American commitments to free trade, the Philippines,
and the Open Door policy in China clashed with her reduced
military capability to respond--especially when coupled with
59Gordon B. Turner, "An (sic] Historical Review of Foreign
Policy, 1784-1944," Naval War ColleQe Review 10, no. 3
(November 1957): 41-42.
60Matloff, "American Approach...," 217-218.
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the free hand which Japan had been given as the dominant power
in the Far East by the Washington Treaty.
61
As the schism between the policy-makers and the defense
departments expanded, military strategists were left to their
own devices. While the country sought to isolate itself from
exterior entanglements, a similar isolation was imposed upon
its military planners. This administrative policy of
isolation, confirmed by successive administrations, together
with the absence of any permanent policy coordination vehicle
prevented the services from providing effective counsel with
regard to the military-strategic aspects of foreign policy
initiatives. Rightly so, the services viewed their position
as subordinate to the civilian government. They felt their
mission was to help make policy effective; not to advocate
policy.62 The traditional American distrust of a professional
military combined with the constitutional principle of
civilian control to foster an almost "monastic divorce" within
the services from politics and policy-making--to the point
where they were effectively hampered by internal as well as
61J.B. Burks, CDR, USN, "The Foreign Policies of the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. and their Effect on the Future World Situation,"
U.S. Naval War ColleQe Information Service for Officers 4, no.
8 (April 1952): 14.
62Fred Greene, "The Military View of American National
Policy, 1904-1940," American Historical Review 66, no. 2
(January 1961): 355-357.
41
external attitudes in making their case for defense
expenditures and strategic concerns.
63
On the other hand, the lack of dialogue and policy
guidance forced the services to develop their own policy
simulacrum. Army and Navy planners alike were uncomfortable
with this situation. They recognized that, in the ideal course
of events, statesmen determine and prioritize policy, the
armed forces provide advice as to the force levels strategies
required, and Congress appropriates the funds necessary to
support a particular policy. For this process to be
effective, a continual and open dialogue on a formal as well
as informal basis was needed between the military and
political representatives.65 Yet this failed to occur--despite
the best efforts of the services to the contrary. Fred Greene
described the situation during the interwar years as follows:
The absence of over-all directives and the failure to
establish a formal coordinating agency during this time
[i.e. 1904-1940] compelled the military planners to fall
back on their own resources in defining our national
policy, national interests, and position in international
affairs. This they felt compelled to do in order to plan
for the country's military security within a meaningful
frame of reference.... They then shaped plans and programs
63Russell F. Weigley, "Military Strategy and Civilian
Leadership," Historical Dimensions of National Security
Problems, ed. Klaus Knorr, (Lawrence,: University of Kansas
Press, 1976): 63-64.
6J.S. McKean, CAPT, USN, "War and Policy," U.S. Naval
Institute ProceedinQs 40, no. 1 (January-February 1914): 9.
65C.C.Gill, CDR, USN, "Policy--Its Relation to War and
Its Bearing upon Preparation for War," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 46, no. 10 (October 1920): 1615.
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in accordance with the position of the United States as
they understood it.... In this manner the services
developed their interpretations of national policy over
several decades. When confronted with a new problem at
any given point, they tended, perhaps unconsciously, to
consider these views as the position of the United
States.6
The services were thus forced to derive their views on
national policy second-hand from indicators such as
Presidential or State Department pronouncements, international
agreements and treaties, Congressional appropriations, and
their reading of the public sentiment--rather than by direct
consultation. Depending upon the source (i.e. the Army or
Navy), the policy analyses varied somewhat on the margins. For
example, the Navy was more interested in the Pacific and Far
East while the Army occupied itself with continental defense.
67
However, all versions identified certain core tenets which
were to persist throughout the inter bellum years:
" Support of the Monroe Doctrine
• Support of Far Eastern policy, specifically:
-- The "Open Door" policy with China
-- The defense of the Philippines
* The right to open trade access
66Ibid., 354-355.
67Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of
Hemisphere Defense, United States Army in World War II, The
Western Hemisphere, vol. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1960), 3.
8Greene, 362, 368, 370-375 passim.
43
* Public sentiment for naval arms control and against
alliances
These derivative policies, together with the recent -experience
of World War I, provided the policy bedrock upon which the
interwar strategic plans were built.
However, this derivative policy, in conjunction with the
experiences and aftermath of the last war, limited the scope
of military thought and preparation to that of defense of the
continent in one theater.69 Action in Congress similarly
reflected this bent toward homeland defense. The National
Defense Act of 1920 was primarily intended to make the
country's mobilization regimes more effective in support of
continental defense. Furthermore, in light of the nation's
isolationist sentiments, Congress consistently under-funded
Army and, to a lesser extent, Navy appropriations throughout
the 1920s and into the 1930s. Army personnel strength
plummeted from 201,918 (officers and enlisted) to a low of
134,024 in 1932. Similarly, persistent under-funding of the
Navy reduced its strength relatively to almost third place
behind the British and the Japanese.70
The schism between policy and planning finally began to
close in the late 1930s as America came to the realization
69Greene, 358; Matloff, 228; Schwarz, 18.
70Gerald E. Wheeler, "National Policy Planning Between
the Wars: Conflict Between Means and Ends," Naval War ColleQe
Review 21, no. 11 (February 1969): 58-60.
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that policies backed only by ideals were failing to perform
up to expectation. Previously, there had been some episodal
contacts of an informal nature. During the 1920s, Foreign
Service officers had attended the Army and Navy War Colleges
and had given lectures to the classes. However, even these
limited initiatives had died out by the end of the decade.
71
The tide began to turn in 1935 when President Roosevelt's
Secretary of State Cordell Hull took a full naval contingent,
including the Chief of Naval Operations, with him to the
London Naval Conference.72 Later that year Hull appointed a
State Department representative to the Joint Planning
Committee for its Far Eastern strategy review. This was
followed in 1938 with his proposal for the formation of the
Standing Liaison Committee. However, the achievements of this
committee were limited by its lack of executive authority and
propensity to avoid controversial issues. Finally, the
President's decision in July 1939 to have the Joint Board
71May, 171; Mead, 41, footnote 25.
7 There were naval "observers" at the 1921 Washington
Conference and the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM W.V. Pratt,
accompanied the 1930 delegation as the sole U.S. Naval
representative to the London Conference. According to Ernest
May, the reason Admiral Pratt was allowed to attend was that
he agreed with the administration's position. In addition, the
U.S. delegation to the unsuccessful 1927 Geneva Disarmament
Conference included three rear admirals. Frederick Moore,
America's Naval ChallenQe (New York: Macmillan Company, 1929),
125; May, 171.
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Then there was the military mindset which anticipated
primarily solitary threats in only one theater against U.S.
forces alone. Subscribing to an economic determinist point of
view, military strategists postulated that the principle
threats would arise from nations capable of rivaling the U.S.
economically. In the post-war environment, that meant Great
Britain and Japan. A portfolio of strategic plans was drawn
up over the next decade. These war plans or "Color Plans", as
they came to be known, encompassed quite a few hypothetical
threats.74 While they may have met the classic military
planning ideal of being prepared to deal with any contingency,
anywhere; many of these plans addressed threats which were
peripheral at best to U.S. interests.75 Despite this plan
cornucopia, both the Army and Navy preferred to concentrate
their planning efforts along service lines against a select
few of their "pet" threats. The few joint plans which were
approved involved areas in which there was enough overlap of
strategic concerns between the services to encourage
collaboration.
Finally, there was the problem of the integration of
intelligence information into the planning process. For most
of the interwar years, there was no joint coordinating agency




for military intelligence. Nor was there any collaboration
with the State Department since as Henry Stimson proclaimed,
"Gentlemen do not read each other's mail." Instead, the
services depended upon an ad hoc liaison between the Office
of Naval Intelligence and--Military Intelligence Division which
proved to be of limited value. The result was a dearth of
national level intelligence as both agencies preferred to
concentrate their efforts on service related intelligence
activities in the absence of any joint guidance. Moreover,
due to a Congressional limit on the number of general officers
assigned to the General Staff, the head of Military
Intelligence Division was a colonel and thus inferior in rank
to his naval counterpart. The result was that, "Intelligence
had little to do with American assessments of Germany and
Japan before December 1941.-'76
As a consequence, strategists made little use of
military intelligence and often failed to even consider it
when developing basic strategy. Instead, plans and estimates
were largely based on geography and the overall military-
political environment. Both the political and military
leadership tended to neglect the use of intelligence
information. Indeed, as David Kahn points out, "The omission
T Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service
in Peace and War, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 188;
Mark M. Lowenthal, "U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy,"
The Washington Papers 12, no. 105 (New York: Praeger
Publishers), 6-8; Watson, 70; Kahn, 476-478.
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of intelligence data from all these discussions of high policy
shows how subsidiary intelligence was.'"n
The planning process itself was fairly adaptable in
terms of how it was begun and carried out. It was flexible in
that it received and incorporated inputs from a number of
sources; not only the operational community, but also the Army
and Naval War Colleges as well as the attenuated intelligence
input. Tasking for strategists came from either the Joint
Board or via the intraservice chain of command. To some
extent, this flexibility was possible because the same
personnel who performed planning in the respective War Plans
Divisions were members of the corresponding joint planning
structure.
Finally, planners in the interwar years faced a number
of constraints. The primary ones being political and economic.
Strategists continually had to confront the problem of how to
support a presumed national policy given constraints such as
treaty limitations and meager appropriations which failed to
support even those limits--all in the light of very real
threats. The search for this elusive balance between national
policy and military capability consumed the better part of two





The first step to be addressed in the strategic
planning process is the source of tasking. During the interwar
years, impetus for the drafting and the ensuing revisions of
war plans came from several sources. The first soirce of
tasking was in-house i.e. within the respective service's
command structure; in particular, the General Staff and the
Office of Naval Operations. The origination of strategic
studies was well within the charter of the Army and Navy War
Plans Divisions.78 Some of the more promising of these studies
were subsequently transformed into war plans, either at the
instruction of the division directcr or his superiors.
The second source of tasking was via the joint
planning structure. In this instance, the Joint Board would
direct its Joint Planning Committee to make strategic studies
and plans as the requirements arose.79 In either case, the
planning requirements were cast against the policy background
discussed in section III-A above.
3. Plan Development
Similar to the sources of tasking, the development of
plans followed two basic schemes. One method was to develop
and approve a plan within a single service and then forward
78qatson, 74; Eberle, 1153-1154.
79Watson, 79-80.
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it to the Joint Board for consideration. Once it reached the
Joint Board, the sponsoring service had to do a certain amount
of selling or "horse-trading" in order to encourage the other
service to take interest in or approve its favored plan. The
second regime for plan development would begin with the Joint
Planning Committee developing a plan at the Joint Board's
behest and forwarding it for approval. In either case, the
Joint Board was responsible for setting the planning
priorities (i.e. which threats were most important).80
Following approval by the Joint Board, a plan was next
forwarded to the Army and Navy Secretaries for approval before
being returned to the Army and Navy for implementation.
Once the joint plans were approved, each service then
had to construct a service specific basic war plan as a
counterpart. The coordination required between the Joint Board
and each service's War Plans Division was facilitated by the
fact that most of the members of the Joint Board and Joint
Planning Committee were drawn from the War Plans Divisions.
Wi'ihin each War Plans Division, specific war plans were then
cwistructed for the service's operating forces. For example,
from the Joint War Plan Orange, the Navy would draft its Basic
War Plan Orange, and from this basic war plan, the
80Braisted, 172-174.
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corresponding navy operational force's Orange War Plans would
be constructed.
81
This development process was flexible enough to allow
the services to follow their proclivities in planning while
providing firm guidance as needed to get the job done. It also
accommodated varying reasons for drafting a war plan. For
example, the Navy preferred to consider plan Orange because,
in addition to addressing a likely threat, it contemplated a
primarily naval war. Conversely, Orange did not provide much
of a planning challenge to the Army. Instead, the Army
preferred to consider a plan involving a Red-Orange coalition;
which had the strongest requirements for land forces.
Admittedly, the Red-Orange plan was an unlikely scenario.
However, Acting Secretary of War Dwight D. Davis allowed that
"since an Orange Plan would not give the Army [i.e. strategic
planners] enough to do, his service would push ahead with
its... requirements for a Red-Orange war."82 Thus, in addition
to its strategic function, the planning process was used to
provide a modicum of training to the planning staffs.
Because of the lack of executive authority, the
primary responsibility for bringing a given plan to fruition
rested within each service's chain of command. This was
81james 0. Richardson, ADM, USN, and George C. Dyer, VADM,
USN, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1973), 256.
82 Braisted, 172,
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because the Joint Board had no executive authority and it
could only register approval of an action by means of a
unanimous vote.83 Furthermore, each service had equal
representation on the board--including the service chiefs. If
a particular issue was controversial, there was no method for
the Joint Board to resolve the crisis except continued
discussion. Ultimately, this meant that the hard questions
were often avoided and that joint plans were a product of a
process of compromise.
Revisions to plans were originally intended to occur
on a yearly basis. In practice, however, it fell to one of the
war Plans Divisions to initiate an in-house update as
appropriate and route it to the Joint Board. If it merited
attention, the other service would provide comments and a
joint revision would be worked out. Thus, revisions usually
occurred at the behest of the individual War Plans Divisions
rather than by Joint Board request.
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Additional inputs into the planning process came from
a variety of sources, some in direct coordination with the war
planners; while others were basically unsolicited (though
welcomed) comments from the operational community as they





plan. On the naval side of the house, even though the General
Board had lost its responsibility to direct planning it still
provided an influential and respected review body for naval
strategic plans.
The War Colleges played an important role, not only in
the training of planners and study of strategic problems, but
also in their use of war gaming to examine and critique plans,
and as a source of innovative thinking. As war games evolved
during the interwar years, they were used to explore the
effects of the naval treaties, test war plans, examine
logistic requirements, and study joint operations; all of
which had implications for strategic planners. Army War Plans
Division, in particular, made extensive use of the Army War
College by assigning a yearly strategic problem for the
faculty and students to study. Often the results of these
studies were used to help prepare war plans. Additionally,
strong ties between the Army and Navy War Colleges enhanced
the efforts of the armed forces to conduct joint planning.
Finally, students at the Army War College studies and drafted
joint strategic plans involving warfare between two opposing
coalitions as early as 1927, and had raised the specter of a
two-ocean war by 1935; long before the Joint Planning





A close cousin of war gaming, operational exercises
afforded the armed forces an additional means of testing
strategy, planning assumptions, and especially the effects of
new weapons technology. For example, in 1929 during United
States Fleet Problem IX, planes from U.S.S. Lexington
successfully conducted a surprise air attack on the Panama
Canal--presaging the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack some twelve
years later. As Admiral Richardson commented, "Fleet problems
were expensive in time, money, and effort, but they led to the
great advances in strategical and tactical thinking which
marked our naval development during this period.
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C. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed two facets of strategic planning
in the interwar years. First, planners had to contend with a
lack of guidance with regard to national policy and interests.
As the civilian political leaders were either unwilling or
unable to provide this guidance, the armed forces were forced
to construct their own substitute by means of observation.
This expedient had the potential of creating a mismatch
between the service's construct and the policy the government
would actually follow; in addition to wasting the efforts of
planners on questionable scenarios. This policy vacuum had a
8Braisted, 178.
89Richardson and Dyer, 236.
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profound effect upon the ability of planners to create
realistic strategic plans.
Finally, the strategic planning process itself was
discussed. Though hampered by a national policy vacuum, a
fairly effective planning structure evolved over time. It was
effective in that it could take a strategic problem, frame it,
identify the principle issues, and construct a plausible war
plan. The main stumbling block to successful planning efforts
was the lack of political guidance to and support for the
military. This era of fiscal austerity (i.e. Spartan defense
budgets) narrowed the strategist's vision and prevented the
serious consideration of more realistic and probable coalition
scenarios. Additionally, the joint planning structure was
limited by the lack of a central authority which could
adjudicate disputes between the Army and Navy approaches to
planning. Despite these handicaps, the interwar planning
structure was flexible both in the generation of plans as well
as the utilization of sources of ideas and criticism.
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IV. PRODUCT
This discussion of interwar strategic planning has thus
far focused on structure and process. It is now time to
consider their result. In other words, what was this structure
and process intended to achieve? Or, more specifically, what
were its products? How were they employed--if used at all?
Were they successful? In what way were they successful?
Strategic planning efforts between the wars spawned two
basic products. One of the products was explicit in that it
was the intended result of the planning operation. The other
was implicit or a sort of by-product of the process. The
explicit product was, of course, the strategic plans
themselves. The implicit product was the generation of
strategists who gained invaluable training while contributing
to the production of the plans themselves. These two products
then, war plans and strategic thinkers, are the subjects of
this chapter. The discussion will begin by examining the
evolution of war plans during the interwar years before taking
up the subject of strategists.
A. STRATEGIC PLANS
1. Color Plans
The Color Plans were the basis for joint strategic
planning for almost twenty years following World War I. Each
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Figure IV-l. The Color Plans, 1919-1941.91
90Curiously enough, the Joint Board developed no Color
plan during the interwar years against Germany (Black).
Matloff, 219.
91Mead, 198-198; Gole, 56.
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The Color plans were war plans in the classic sense of
contingency planning i.e. abstract exercises in preparation
for any conceivable emergency--without regard to their
probability. Virtually ignoring the recent experience of
coalition warfare in Europe, the military strategists' vision
narrowed, almost without exception, to the consideration of
solitary threats on a single axis or front and strictly in the
defense of the continental U.S. or its possessions. This
defensive focus represented a nostalgic throwback to that
twilight era before World War I and the nation's undesired
thrust into the maelstrom of international politics. In that
light, the Color Plans represented what Maurice Matloff called
a "retreat from reality."
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As implausible as the Color Plans were, the post-war
environment in the U.S. frustrated attempts to achieve
reality. The atmosphere of fiscal austerity, antimilitarism,
disarmament, and isolationism as well as the lack of any
immediate threat proved deadening. The Army was pared to a
skeletal cadre force while the Navy barely had the strength
to support combat operations in one theater. In response,
strategic planners concentrated their efforts on the types of
scenarios they believed Congress and the public might support.
They also shaped their plans by the availability of forces
instead of realistic war-fighting requirements. Even the
92Mead, 189; Matloff, 217-218.
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senior military leaders all but abandoned hope of obtaining
realistic appropriations as they struggled with the problem
of aligning presumed political commitments with military
capabilities. As it was, even the most modest plans
considered probably would have stretched the available
military resources.
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Of the dozen or so Color Plans developed between the
wars, most were not true strategic plans. Instead, they could
be more properly considered operational or campaign plans
bearing "...little relation to contemporary political and
military alignments.",95 After the Washington Conference in
1921, only two nations were strong enough to pose threats to
the U.S.--Great Britain (Red) and Japan (Orange). Following
their proclivities, the Army and Navy pursued planning along
individual service lines. Only three plans called for a
general mobilization of the nation and major land-based
combat: Blue--an undefined national emergency, Red--an
invasion by Great Britain, and the Red-Orange coalition plan.
The Army took the lead on all of these plans while the Navy
93Greene, 355; Watson, 36-37. Mark Watson clearly
documents this pervasive atmosphere using an exchange between
General Marshall and a member of the House Committee on
Appropriations in April 1941.
94Matloff, 218; Cline, 35.
95Matloff, 218.
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concentrated its efforts upon the naval war contemplated by
the Orange plan.
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The mobilization plans (i.e. Blue, Red, Red-Orange)
held the most interest for the Army since it was incapable of
prosecuting any but the most limited conflicts without a
general mobilization. Interestingly enough, Blue received the
most attention from Army War Plan Division staffers prior to
1939 and while Red was the only plan of the three to be
approved by the Joint Board.97 The Army had trouble interesting
its sister service in either the Red or Red-Orange plans since
the Navy viewed Japan as the more likely threat. In fact, the
Navy War Plans Division dropped Great Britain from its list
of potential enemies altogether in 1929--prior to the approval
of the Red plan by the Joint Board in May 1930. However, the
Army persisted with its planning against Red/Red-Orange until
1936 when the Joint Board also concluded that a war with Red
was improbable. Even so the Army's efforts with Red-Orange
coalition plan were useful in establishing the principle of
defeating an Atlantic-based enemy first while fighting a
defensive war in the Pacific.98  Ultimately, the actual
strategic scenario had little bearing on the real fruits of
the Army's efforts i.e. the lessons derived over the years
96Braisted, 172; Cline 36; Morton 7.
97Cline, 36; Braisted, 173-174.
98Braisted, 177,181-182.
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from having repeatedly addressed and reviewed the problems
associated with a national mobilization.9
The Navy in contrast, occupied itself with what was
essentially an operational plan for fighting the Japanese. It
contemplated a mainly naval war in which Orange threatened
U.S. interests in the Far East and with the Army playing a
supporting role by holding out in the Philippines until
relieved by the advancing U.S. fleet. With these joint combat
roles in mind, in March 1924, Orange became the first Color
plan to be approved by the Joint Board. Work on Orange
constituted the bulk of Joint Board's planning efforts and
officially underwent five revisions between 1924 and 1938.100
Even though it represented the most realistic scenario
of the entire Color plan portfolio, from its inception
planners recognized the impossibility of its implementation
considering the interwar U.S. force posture.101 Furthermore,
whether or not the Philippines could hold out against the
Japanese onslaught was problematic in the face of a national
policy vacuum which refused to change its apparent policies
or provide the forces to carry them out. Consequently,
9Although Red-Orange did raise the possibility of having
to fight a two-ocean war. Braisted, 177-178.
100Grace P. Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in World War II: The War AQainst Japan, (Annapolis:




critical strategic questions were left begging by a political
leadership which declined to state its policy goals in the Far
East--or decide if the Philippines were worth retaining in the
event of a conflict with Japan. Later versions of Orange
implicitly wrote-off the colony. Their recovery could only
come as a result of several years of mobilization effort at
home accompanied by a hard fought naval campaign which spanned
the Pacific Ocean. By 1938, the Orange plan ". ..was less a
plan than a description of what would happen when the Japanese
decided it was time for war Lemphasis added]." '1 2
The Orange series of plans can be faulted for their
focus on a single enemy in a single theater (i.e. Japan in the
Pacific Ocean) and being more of an operational than strategic
plan. But despite these flaws, the Orange planning efforts
produced many positive results. First and foremost, they
served to highlight the contradictions between national policy
(or lack thereof) and strategy.I1 3 As the plans developed, a
retreat ensued from the bold assertions of the early Orange
plans which anticipated relief forces arriving in the
Philippines within 60 days gave way to the tacit
acknowledgement by 1938 that the Philippines were a "write-
off." Secondly, they helped to identify the defense of the
102Wheeler, 64-65.
3Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a
Strategy," World Politics 11, no. 2 (January 1959): 244;
Greene, 369-7?.
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U.S. and the Western Hemisphere as the primary strategic
objective.1 04 The Navy's proclivity for forward defense was
slowly but surely tempered by succeeding versions of Orange
which drove homnt 'Is osts of overextending naval forces in
the pursuit of peripheral strategic goals while leaving the
homeland vu..erable. Thirdly, the Orange plans demonstrated
the necessity for a slow, methodical amphibiolis campaign
advancing through the Pacific Islands combined with attacks
on vital sea lines of communication in order to defeat the
Japanese. 1 5 Reluctantly, the fantastic visions of a classic
apocalyptic battle in the Mahan tradition in which lumbering
fleets of battleships "slugged it out" were replaced by a long
and hard-fought naval campaign spanning several years.
Finally, the Orange plans, in conjunction with naval arms
limitation efforts, spurred the development of innovative
doctrine, weapons, and equipment.106 Carriers, aircraft,
amphibious doctrine, landing craft, and strategic bombers all
were important outgrowths of this labor.
2. Rainbow Plans
By late 1938, events in Europe crystallized the
possibility of German or Italian (i.e. Axis) threats to the




U.S. hemispheric interests. For strategists the idea of a one
threat, one front war like that envisioned by the Orange plans
had become less and less viable. Abandoning the Color plans,
the Joint Board tasked the Joint Planning Committee to study
how the U.S. might protect itself and Latin America from Axis
threats while simultaneously fending off Japanese incursions
in the Far East.107 The committee report of January 1939 was
significant for its assumptions and conclusions. The first
assumption was built on the Red-Orange planning experience and
held that, because of the primacy of Atlantic interests, the
U.S. would not reinforce the Philippines; nor was it
desireable to do so. More importantly, the Joint Planning
Committee assumed that the U.S. would probably be one member
of a coalition of democratic powers (e.g. Great Britain and/or
France) in opposition to an enemy coalition. The committee
report concluded that the problem of coalition warfare needed
to be addressed in future strategic planning by the Joint
Board. Additionally, it pointed out the urgency of immediately
beginning to redress readiness deficiencies among the armed
forces.1
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Work commenced at once on a new series of plans
called, aptly enough, the Rainbow plans. Instead of detailed
operational plans like those produced by the Color series, the
107Wheeler, 65.
108Watson, 97-99; Wheeler, 65-66.
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Rainbow plans were more conceptual. Each embraced the basic
objective of defending the Western Hemisphere against Axis
aggression. Initially, the planners were to assume that the
U.S. would stand alone against a coalition of Axis powers.
Additionally, each plan was to identify the cooperation
required from potential allies in order to be fully effective.
Louis Morton detailed the basic scenarios of the five Rainbow
plans as follows:
Rainbow 1 assumed the United States to be at war without
major allies. United States forces would act jointly to
prevent the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting
the territory of the Western Hemisphere north of 10
degrees South Latitude, from which the vital interests of
the United States might be threatened. The joint tasks of
the Army and Navy included protection of the United
States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade. A
strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific,
from behind the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, until
developments in the Atlantic permitted concentration of
the fleet in mid-Pacific for offensive action against
Japan.
Rainbow 2 assumed that the United States, Great Britain,
and France would be acting in concert, with limited
participation of U.S. forces in Continental Europe and in
the Atlantic. The United States could, therefore,
undertake immediate offensive operations in the Pacific
to sustain the interests of democratic powers by the
defeat of enemy forces.
Rainbow 3 assumed the United States to be at war without
major allies. Hemisphere defense as to be assured, as in
Rainbow 1, but with early projection of U.S. forces from
Hawaii into the western Pacific.
Rainbow 4 assumed the United States to be at war without
major allies, employing its forces in defense of the whole
of the Western Hemisphere, but also with provision for
United States Army forces to be sent to the southern part
of South America, and to be used in joint operations in
eastern Atlantic areas. A strategic defensive, as in
Rainbow 1, was to be maintained in the Pacific until the
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situation in the Atlantic permitted transfer of major
naval forces for an offensive against Japan.
Rainbow 5 assumed the United States, Great Britain, and
France to be acting in concert; hemisphere defense was to
be assured as in Rainbow 1, with early projection of U.S.
forces to the eastern Atlantic, and to either or both the
African and European continents; offensive operations were
to be conducted, in concert with British and allied
forces, to effect the defeat of Germany and Italy. A
strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific
until success against the European Axis Powers permitted
transfer of malor forces to the Pacific for an offensive
against Japan.
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The embodiment of coalition warfare in the Rainbow
plans was the culmination of a half-decade of flirtation with
the concept. The Army War College played an important role in
shift of focus from the Pacific to Europe and what ultimately
became a "Germany first" strategy. It began studying coalition
warfare as early as 1927 with a war plan "Rainbow" which
pitted the U.S., in alliance with the League of Nations,
against a hostile coalition. Another study in 1934 projected
Orange and Carnation (Manchukuo) provoking a war with Pink
(Russia [sic]). Eventually Pink is joined by Yellow, Red (plus
its dependencies), and Blue. Student planning the following
year postulated an allied coalition of France, Italy, Great
Britain, and the U.S. against a "Nazi Confederation" of
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.110 Similarly in
1932, the Naval War College "...recommended that, when
109Morton, "Germany First," 15.
11OGole, 53, 56-57.
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considering possible coalition wars, the services should study
war between a Red-Blue (Anglo-American) coalition and a
hostile coalition including Orange.'1 11 The early spadework
done by the War Colleges on coalition warfare percolated
upwards through their close ties with the War Plans Divisions
and eventually emerged into the joint structure through the
Rainbow series.112
From 1939 on, work on the Rainbow plans progressed in
parallel with world events. Concentration shifted from one
Rainbow plan to another depending upon the strategic outlook
before finally settling upon Rainbow 5 as war approached.
Early on, Rainbow 2 seemed to be the most likely case.
However, the collapse of France in June 1940 brought Rainbow
4 to the fore; a plan which a month earlier had been given
last priority. Great Britain's survival under the German
onslaught proved to be the deciding factor in the eventual
selection of Rainbow 5 as the strategic template upon which
the American war effort would be built.113
The years 1939-1941 were a period of feverish activity
for planners as they struggled to pin down the most promising
Braisted, 180.
112Maurice Matloff, in his writing about war planning from
1939-1941, credits harried strategic planners racing against
the clock with evolving the critical coalition concepts and
ignores the important contributions made earlier by the War
Colleges. Gole, 53; Matloff, 213-243.
113Morton, "Germany First," 18-20; Matloff, 233.
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strategic plan and establish ties with future allies while the
country completed the transition to a war-time footing. The
character of planning efforts similarly transitioned from the
earlier progression along parochial service lines in the
development of what were essentially operational plans to true
joint planning on a global scale--including the first
tentative steps at coordination with the U.S. political
leadership cataloged in Chapter 3 above.114
However, Rainbow 5 seemingly ,'id a glaring omission in
that it failed to mention the Pacific. However, Dana Mead
points out that, "Rainbow 5 reflected the high level strategic
decision, already taken, that the European war had priority
and must first be fought and won, and if Japan attacked in the
Pacific the United States would fight a deliberate holding
action there pending the defeat of its greater threat in the
Atlantic."115 Thus Rainbow 5's most important contribution was
its over-arching strategic framework. Subordinate commands
were left to fill in the details. Conveniently, some of the
Color plans such as Orange were coopted into the operational
fabric of Rainbow 5.116 Rainbow 5 and its allied doppleganQer,





ABC-i, 117 were subsequently incorporated into the framework-of
the American Victory program for the general mobilization of
the entire nation. Ultimately, Rainbow 5 provided the strategy
which determined the Victory program's personnel and war
materiel requirements.
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The Rainbow plans were significant because, instead of
addressing hypothetical contingencies, they focused upon
current and realistic strategic issues. They were the first
attempts by the Joint Board/Joint Planning Committee to
grapple with the problems of coalition warfare--though the
groundwork had been laid at the War Colleges earlier in the
decade. Consequently, they compelled an unparalleled expansion
in the coordination of strategy with policy. Ultimately, not
only did the U.S. political leadership have to be consulted,
but also potential allies such as Great Britain.119
B. STRATEGISTS
Strategists were also an important product of the
strategic planning process. As a result, the U.S. arrived on
the doorstep of World War II with a trained cadre of strategic
thinkers. This outcome was not necessarily by design, however,
since the Army and Navy characteristically "groomed" their
117The first report of the American-British (staff)




strategists by employing different methods. The Navy favored
using the operating environment to inculcate strategic
concepts in its officers. This was because, even though it
felt the effects of interwar austerity, it was still able to
hold fleet exercises as well as maintain a modest presence
overseas which afforded a measure of experience.120
The Naval War College provided another useful source of
strategists. The service typically sent some of its more
promising officers there for training. At the War College,
extensive war gaming was employed as a means of teaching
strategy and tactics as well as being "The major agency in
evolving strategic as well as narrow operational plans.... ,,121
The War College provided a welcomed respite from the day to
day grind of the operational navy. The officers who attended
the school valued the time they were afforded to read and
reflect upon strategy and foreign policy. Admirals Nimitz and
Spruance were both appreciative of their War College
experience. Nimitz wrote, "I credit the Naval War College for
such success I achieved in strategy and tactics both in peace
and war." While Spruance commented, "I consider that what I
learned during those years was of the utmost value to me, in




international affairs and of naval history and strategy.'
'1 22
Alumni and faculty who distinguished themselves later in World
War II included: Ernest J. King, Chester Nimitz, Royal
Ingersoll, Raymond Spruance, Forrest Sherman, Harold R. Stark,
Richmond K. Turner, and Carl Moore.
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In contrast, however, the Army lacked the wherewithal to
hold exercises on anything approaching the scale of the
Navy's. In the absence of operational opportunities, it was
forced to rely almost exclusively upon academic training and
General Staff experience in order to develop its corps of
strategists. To do so, attendance at the Army War College
became de riqueur for most aspiring Army officers during the
interwar years. Indeed, virtually all of the major general
officers in the Army in World War II attended with the notable
exceptions of MacArthur and Marshall.
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After attendance at the War College, where war planning
was an integral part of the curriculum, many of the graduates
were recommended for duty on the General Staff including War
122Nimitz and Spruance as quoted in Buell, "Spruance: Part
I," 33.
'
23Thomas B. Buell, LCDR, USN, "Admiral Raymond A.
Spruance and the Naval War College: Part I--Preparing for
World War II," Naval War College Review 23, no. 7 (March
1971) :36; idem, "Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and the Naval War
College: Part II--From Student to Warrior," Naval War ColleQe
Review 23, no. 8 (April 1971): 41-42; Michael Vlahos, The Blue
Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission 1919-
1941 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980), 201-202.
124Ball, 414.
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were recommended for duty on the General Staff including War
Plans Division. 12 Later on, after successful operational
tours, many of these same officers returned to War Plans
Division as the division chief, or to the War College as
commander. This practice served to strengthen the maturation
of strategists. Moreover duty with the General Staff
(including War Plans Division) and the War College faculty was
coveted since it was considered to aid promotions as well as
help in obtaining choice postings.126 In general, the Army
approach achieved its aim, as Harry Ball put it, of producing
... competent, if not necessarily brilliant, leadership that




This chapter illustrated the development of the two most
important products of the interwar planning process i.e.
strategic plans and strategists. War plans evolved over the
years from simple one threat, one theater operational plans
into global, coalition warfare of grand strategic scale. The
125Among the Army War College's distinguished graduates
were Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, William Halsey, Mark
Clark, George Patton, Walter B. Smith, Hoyt Vandenburg,






evolution of these plans was abetted by a corresponding
maturation of a corps of military strategists and abetted by
the efforts of the Army and Navy War Colleges--particularly
in the areas of coalition warfare and war gaming.
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V. CONCLUSION
A survey of the contemporary literature on strategic
planning during the interwar years generally leads to the
conclusion that it either did not exist, or that if it did;
it was so ad hoc that it did not work. In other words, the
conventional wisdom is that integrated strategic planning, for
all intents and purposes, did not exist prior to World War
II. While there is a certain element of truth in each of these
assertions, the question is more complex and requires greater
scrutiny. That the planning organizations were fledgling--
true. That the structure was incomplete--true. That the
process was flawed--true. That the products (i.e. strategic
plans) were deficient--true. On a superficial level, all of
the statements are correct. This is indeed the perception when
attention is concentrated at the micro-level.
However, once the focus is shifted to the macro-level, a
quite different picture appears. Instead of a process so ad
hoc that it was dysfunctional, one can observe the emergence
of an adolescent strategic culture. Of course, this culture
made mistakes as adolescents are wont to do; but it also
learned and evolved. Moreover, despite its incomplete
structure, its flawed process, its deficient products, this
adolescent arrived on the doorstep of World War II with fairly
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clear idea of what needed to be done. More importantly,
strategists knew what pieces of the puzzle were missing and
what needed to be done in order to ferret them out. In other
words, the U.S. had a systematic, if imperfect, planning
structure and process; and it had spent the previous two
decades training a cadre of strategists.
While the ad hoc political culture of the United States
and decentralized planning structure has been criticized, one
must recognize that it was able to give rise to effective
strategists who produced coherent plans during World War II.
The interwar plans themselves may have been flawed. However,
as war approached this experienced corps of strategists was
able to take those imperfect plans and meld them into a
blueprint for victory. Ultimately, despite an understandable
and youthful apprehension, the U.S. strategic planning
organization was sufficiently, if not optimally, ready to
guide a country at war.
In terms of structure, the immediate post-World War I and
pre-World War II eras were of primary importance. World War
I provided legitimacy for both the fledgling General Staff and
Office of Naval Operations organizations as well as the
impetus for creating their respective War Plans Divisions. The
creation and acceptance of these organizations within the Army
and Navy was an essential precondition to the development of
effective strategic planning from an organizational culture
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standpoint. In addition, the War Plans Divisions, in
conjunction with the War Colleges, created the necessary pool
of officers experienced in strategic thinking. Without this
trained pool of strategists, planning on anything other than
an ad hoc basis would have been impossible.
The fact that the joint planning structure was created
concurrently with the services' planning structure could
explain its weakness. The government had no previous
experience in fostering strategic culture. It was attempting
to build an effective joint planniny organization on an A
priori basis without the benefit of previous experience and
simultaneously with the creation of the only organizations
that could provide that experience in an authoritative manner.
In other words, is it reasonable to expect that when
constructing a strategic culture for what was essentially the
first time, that it would function perfectly?
The missing structural elements were identified in the
early interwar years as the planning organizations became more
accomplished. The primary deficiency was the lack of policy
input to the planning process while secondary concerns were
the integration of intelligence and the Joint Board's lack of
authority commensurate with its responsibility. The failure
to effectively address these defects could be attributed
fundamentally to the prevailing lack of urgency that the
nation felt with respect to strategic threats for the bulk of
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the interwar years. This assertion is reinforced by the
initiation of increasingly constructive reform, such as the
creation of the Standing Liaison and Joint Inteldigence
Comptittees, intended to correct these problems as the threat
of war loomed ever larger in the late 1930s. Though their
usefulness was limited, as newly created organizations often
are, they prepared the way for more effective successors.
The interwar strategic planning structure furnished the
basis for the resulting process. Within the services there
were established procedures for the development of plans.
Similarly, when the services agreed on a particular threat,
they were able to construct joint war plans. As with
structure, planners soon recognized the missing components of
the planning process in the post-war years. They realized
early on that a national policy input was required in order
to accomplish effective strategic planning. Since none was
forthcoming from the political leadership, they proceeded to
construct their own facsimile. The near total lack of national
policy irput was the most glaring hindrance strategists had
to contend With.
There were also other minor problems with the process.
Plans wer developed to support non-existcnt policies. A form
of strategic tunnel-vision led strategists to assume one
threat, one front wars. The Army and the Navy often "marched
to different drummers." However, the planning process was
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flexible enough to identify and correct errors and it
continued to mature throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
The War Colleges augmented the process by providing an
effective training establishment, their war gaming facilities
afforded a means of testing plans, and the collegial
environment provided fertile ground for innovation and the
exploration of strategic alternatives. As Henry Gole
demonstrated, the War Colleges were considering warfare
between coalitions as early as 1927; long before the Joint
Board began to address the problem. Moreover, the many of the
o.icers who worked in the War Plans Divisions and attended
the War Colleges during the 1920s and 1930s rose to become the
principle admirals, generals, and strategists of World War
II.
The plans which were developed between the wars were far
from perfect. However, they do show a clear progression in
terms of increasing sophistication and realism. Two decades
of strategic planning experience were embodied in the Rainbow
plans. Even so, they were not quite perfect. However, Rainbow
5 was close enough to establish our wartime trajectory and
provide a basis for necessary adjustments.
When all is said and done, the real product of the
interwar strategic planning process was not the war plans
themselves or whether they were "joint" or not. The real
prcduct was the strategists who were trained by working on war
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plans during the interwar years. The plans were imperfect; as
plans will be, given the conditions under which they were
developed. Moreover, the traditional emphasis on the accuracy
of the plans has served to obscure the contributions of the
strategists. After all, it is all but impossible, under the
best of conditions, to construct a strategic plan in the
present which will perfectly match the conditions of a unknown
future. What is achievable, however, is to develop general
plans which can subsequently be tailored to the precise
conditions of the future situation. To accomplish this,
seasoned'strategists are required or the results will be truly
ad hoc. An experienced strategist can take a less than optimal
plan and improve it to fit the task. The ability of the
inexperienced person to do the same is doubtful at best.
The interwar strategic planning process produced men who
knew how to think strategically. These men were trained by a
systematic process which equipped them with the conceptual
tools and experience necessary to successfully identify
strategy defects and institute the required changes. These men
were trained in an era in which strategy had been decoupled
from national policy and in which intelligence information had
a peripheral role to the process at best. Yet they were able
to identify and rise above these shortcomings. Ultimately, the
essence of American strategic planning between the wars was
that it was a de facto plan built around the capacity to plan.
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As Urs Schwarz points out, the "American principle of
unpreparedness" was the nation's traditional approach to
warfare. The Spanish-American War provided a foretaste, World
War I a relatively gentle prod, and the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor a firm boot in the derriere to a nation reluctant
to shed its comfortable old introspective habits and replace
them with the discomfiting responsibilities inherent in being
the foremost power in the world. The American strategic
culture has continued to evolve throughout this century.
Perhaps one of the components of the evolution of the
strategic planning process is the ideas which are transmitted
from one generation of strategists to another. As rendered by
this discussion, the ideas transmitted from the interwar years
may be briefly stated as follows: First, the country must
consciously attend to the training of strategists in order to
be capable of developing effective strategy. Conversely,
dependence on natural selection as a means of producing
strategists is the road to defeat. Secondly, the accuracy of
plans is a secondary issue. T:ained strategists can make plans
more accurate as threats become more immediate.128 Finally,
while national policy and intelligence lacunae can be
128One discontinuity between the interwar years and today
must be noted here. That is the time component. The technology
of the era enabled the strategists to plan for a lengthy
period of mobilization and adjustment both prior to and after
commencement of hostilities. Today's strategists are not
afforded this luxury due to the immense reach and
destructiveness of modern weapons.
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surmounted by capable strategists, truly effective "joint"
planning must structurally and procedurally include these
components. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the
present emphasis on "joint" strategic planning, with its focus
on the military only, is misplaced and ignores the critical
importance of the political component of strategy. While the
roles and missions controversy is still a major problem for
defense management as witnessed by Goldwater Nichols, the fact
is that the aftermath of Pearl Harbor was much better than
would have otherwise been the case had the interwar years not
produced skilled strategists who possessed the joint planning
orientation that they did.
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